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A federal court confronted with an action involving the same issues
and parties as a pending state court suit has four options: enjoin the state
proceeding,2 stay the federal action,3 dismiss the federal action,4 or let both
suits proceed.' A federal court's refusal to stay a diversity action before it
raises two questions: is the order denying a stay appealable? If so, should
the court of appeals ever require the district court to grant a stay? In
1. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982)
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) provides: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly author-
ized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." While this section allows a federal court to enjoin state
actions involving property over which it has custody, it does not authorize injunc-
tions to restrain state proceedings in personam merely because a parallel proceeding
is pending in federal court. Jett v. Zink, 474 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 854 (1973). A state court may, however, voluntarily stay its proceedings fol-
lowing the assumption of federal jurisdiction if it appears that the federal court may
better resolve the dispute. See, e.g., Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103,
104-05 (7th Cir. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion); see generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 10 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co., 89 F.R.D.
148 (D. Colo. 1981).
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Microsq/?ware Computer Systems v. Ontel Corp., 6 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit answered yes to both questions,7 straining its
jurisdiction to impose unprecedented substantive limits on district courts
exercising jurisdiction in the face of parallel proceedings. The decision
sharply contrasts with the strong federal policies that restrict appellate re-
view to final judgments and require courts to exercise jurisdiction absent
exceptional circumstances.
On December 15, 1980, Ontel, a New York corporation, filed a con-
tract damages action against Microsoftware Computers Systems (MCS), an
Illinois corporation,8 in New York state court.' MCS filed an answer and a
counterclaim.'0 On February 25, 1981, MCS brought a diversity action
against Ontel in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. 1" Its complaint was virtually identical to the answer and
counterclaim filed in New York.12 The only difference between the federal
and state actions was that MCS was the plaintiff in Illinois while Ontel was
the plaintiff in New York.' To avoid the inconvenience of trying concur-
rent proceedings in distant forums, Ontel sought a stay of the federal action
pending judgment in the state court. 4 The motion was denied,15 Ontel
6. 686 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1982).
7. Id at 536, 538. The Seventh Circuit has been at the forefront in concurrent
proceedings litigation. In addition to the main case, see generally Evans Transp. v.
Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co.,
689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982); Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817
(7th Cir. 1981); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 500 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), revd, 437
U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opinion), remanded, 586 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978), remanded
sub nom., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), aft'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430
F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Burrows v. Sebastian, 448 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
8. 686 F.2d at 533. Ontel alleged that MCS owed for goods delivered under
contract. The contract provided that New York law would govern disputes.
9. Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York.
10. 686 F.2d at 533. Initially, MCS claimed that service of process was defec-
tive. On May 26, 1981, the Supreme Court of Nassau County held that service was
good, and MCS appealed. When Microsofiware was argued before the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the state appeal was pending.
11. Eastern Division; Judge Julius Hoffman.
12. MCS claimed breaches of warranty and contract, misrepresentation, and
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1218, 261-272 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982). All the claims arose
from the sale of goods underlying the New York action. 686 F.2d at 533.
13. 686 F.2d at 533. The district court had found that the federal and state
actions were virtually identical. Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., No.
81 C 1014, excerpt of proceedings at 4 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1981).
14. 686 F.2d at 533.
15. Id Ontel filed motions in the district court seeking reconsideration of the
order denying the stay, as well as a stay pending reconsideration. Both were denied.
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appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
and a divided panel reversed.
1 6
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The threshold issue before the court of appeals was whether the order
denying the stay was appealable. 7 Generally, only final judgments may be
appealed," and a denial of a stay request is not final because it signals the
parties to begin litigating the merits.1 9 Nevertheless, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a) (1),2o a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allows ap-
peal from interlocutory orders granting or refusing injunctions. 2 ' An order
staying or refusing to stay proceedings is equivalent to an injunction if two
conditions are satisfied: first, the action stayed (or the action in which the
stay request is denied) must be legal, rather than equitable; second, the stay
must permit prior determination of an equitable defense or counterclaim.
22
This historical interpretation of the interlocutory appeal statute is called
the Enelow-Ettleson rule.
23
In Mirosoftware, the Seventh Circuit held that Ontel's stay request met
Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., No. 81 C 1014, excerpt of proceedings
at 2, 3 (N.D. Il1. July 20, 1981).
16. 686 F.2d at 538. Judge Doyle, dissenting, was a district judge sitting by
designation. His opinion reflects greater deference to the district court's discretion.
See id at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
17. 686 F.2d at 533. The district court, ruling on Ontel's motion for certifica-
tion for permissive interlocutory appeal and a stay pending appeal, found that the
order was not appealable and refused to certify it under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976)
(allows permissive interlocutory appeal where district court and court of appeals
consent). Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., No. 81 C 1014, excerpt of
proceedings at 4, 5 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1981).
18. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940); 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1976). A final judgment ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing to do but
execute the judgment. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
19. 686 F.2d at 533-34. See Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., 593 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Kappelman v. Delta Airlines, 539 F.2d 165,
167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); Ephraim Freightways v.
Red Ball Motor Freight, 376 F.2d 40, 41 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
Orders granting stays, however, may be appealable final judgments. See note 91
infra.
20. (1976).
21. This was the first statutory exception to the final judgment rule. See Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 828, 829. For the history of § 1292(a)(1), see
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec., 325 F.2d 822, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964); Note, Appellate Review of
Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 518-22 (1972); Note, Appeal-
ability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 367-75 (1961).
22. This is the most repeated form of the rule, taken from Jackson Brewing Co.
v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
23. It is named for two Supreme Court decisions: Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life
10191983]
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both requirements and assumed jurisdiction.24 The court found that the
federal action was legal because MCS sought damages for breach of con-
tract.25 The court also reasoned that Ontel's stay request raised an equita-
ble defense of duplicative lawsuits, similar to a bill of peace, thus invoking
the federal court's equitable discretion.26 This analysis raises two issues:
whether the Enelow-Ettleson rule should apply where law and equity are
merged, and if so, was the rule properly applied in Microsofware?
A. Historic Analogy
The concept equating stays with injunctions has roots in the English
Court of Chancery. After King James I affirmed equity's power to enjoin
proceedings at law,2 7 plaintiffs often initiated identical actions in the sepa-
rate law and equity courts.28 Defendants in turn petitioned Chancery to
require the plaintiffs to elect a single forum. While equity would enjoin the
simultaneous action at law, the law courts had no power to restrain pro-
ceedings in equity and could prevent duplicative litigation only by staying
their own actions.
29
Federal courts initially maintained separate law and equity courts, and
equity practice was governed by the chancery rules as modified by the
Supreme Court."0 The Law and Equity Act of 191531 eroded some of the
distinction between law and equity by permitting a defendant to plead eq-
Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379
(1935).
24. 686 F.2d at 534-36.
25. MCS's federal complaint primarily alleged breach of contract. The court
of appeals found that the alleged violation of Illinois law and the request for a
declaration that the contract damage limits were void were.incidental and did not
affect the complaint's legal nature. Id at 536 n.4. Determining the nature of the
action stayed can be complex when legal and equitable claims are mixed. Gener-
ally an action is legal if its claims are predominantly legal, Ephraim Freightways v.
Red Ball Motor Freight, 376 F.2d 40, 41 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967),
or the equitable relief sought is merely incidental. Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packag-
ing Indus., 516 F.2d 975, 978-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
26. 686 F.2d at 536.
27. See G. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 120-21 (2d
ed. 1946).
28. Chancery jurisdiction was often abused by plaintiffs, who invoked it merely
to delay just proceedings at law. Id. at 123.
29. See gnerally 1 E. DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 797-98,
1618 (W. Cooper 5th ed. 1879); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
460-65 (1931). Although a bill was introduced in the House of Lords to give the
common law courts the power to restrain equity judges with writs of prohibition,
the measure did not pass. Id at 464.
30. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
31. Ch. 90, §§ 274a-b, 38 Stat. 956, 957 (1915), repealed, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 997.
1020 [Vol. 48
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uitable defenses in actions at law, but the two systems were still governed by
separate substantive rules. As in chancery, equity could restrain proceed-
ings at law pending determination of equitable defenses, but law courts
could not enjoin equity. Nevertheless, if a law court stayed its proceedings
to allow a prior equitable determination, the result was as if equity had
enjoined the action at law. 2 Thus, the law court's stay was equivalent to
an injunction.
This reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court in Endow v. New
York Life Insurance Co. 3 The plaintiff brought an action at law to recover on
an insurance policy. The defendant pleaded fraud, an equitable defense,
and the trial court stayed legal proceedings.3 4 Based on the historic anal-
ogy to equity, the Supreme Court held that the stay was an appealable
interlocutory order.35 While recognizing that the Law and Equity Act had
simplified pleading by allowing equitable defenses in actions at law, the
Court found that the Act was not intended to disturb the substance of eq-
uity's power. Thus, when a court of law required, or refused to require the
prior determination of an equitable defense, it exercised equitable jurisdic-
tion, granting or refusing an injunction.36
Following the merger of law and equity,37 the Court reconsidered the
issue in Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 8 The Court held that
32. Griesa v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 165 F. 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1908); Purdy
v. Baker, 92 A.D. 242, 86 N.Y.S. 1065 (1904).
33. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
34. Id at 381.
35. Id at 381-83. The case was decided under § 129 of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 227 (1940), the predecessor to § 1292 (a)(1).
36. 293 U.S. at 381-83.
The power to stay proceedings in another court appertains distinctively to
equity in the enforcement of equitable principles, and the grant or refusal
of such a stay by a court of equity of proceedings at law is a grant or
refusal of an injunction within the meaning of § 129. And, in this respect,
it makes no difference that the two cases, the suit in equity for an injunc-
tion and the action at law in which the proceedings are stayed, are both
pending in the same court, in view of the established distinction between
"proceedings at law and proceedings in equity in the national courts and
between the powers of those courts when sitting as courts of law and when
sitting as courts of equity."
Id (quoting Griesa v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 165 F. 48, 50-51 (8th Cir.
1908)).
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as
civil action."), adopted by the Supreme Court order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783,
under authority conferred by the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)) (power to unify rules of law and equity). The new
provisions were intended to "unite the general rules prescribed for cases in equity
with those in actions at law to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee note.
38. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
1983]
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Endow was good law even under a system ostensibly lacking substantial
distinctions between law and equity.3 9 Then, after apparently repudiating
Enelow and Ettleson in City of Morgantown v. Royal Insurance Co.,4° the Court
retreated in Baltimore Contractors v. Bodnger.4 1 In Baltimore Contractors, the
plaintiffs brought an action for an accounting, and the defendant moved for
a stay pending arbitration. The Supreme Court held that the denial of the
stay was not an appealable interlocutory order.42 The historic analogy to
law and equity did not apply because the action in which the stay was
sought and the arbitration defense were equitable. By denying the stay,
equity was merely controlling its docket, not refusing an injunction.4 3 Al-
though the Court criticized Enelow-Ettleson as outdated," it concluded the
rule should be applied to limit interlocutory appeals.4 5
39. Id at 192. The defendants argued that because merger had abolished the
distinctions between law and equity, the stay was simply a trial court controlling its
own docket, and not equivalent to an injunction issued by a court of equity. Id. at
190. The Court spurned this distinction. "The plaintiffs are. . . in no different
position than if a state equity court had restrained them from proceeding in the law
action. Nor are they differently circumstanced than was the plaintiff in the Endow
case." Id at 192. The Court's reasoning avoided the issue of whether merger had
sufficiently eroded the "established distinction" between law and equity that Endow
had relied on. One authority, however, does not think Ettleson could have been
distinguished from Enelow. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESS-
MAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3923 (1977).
40. 337 U.S. 254 (1955). The Court observed:
The fiction of a court with two sides, one of which can stay proceedings in
the other, is not applicable where there is no other proceeding in existence
to be stayed. . . . [D]istinctions from common law practice which sup-
ported our conclusions in the Endow and Ettleson cases supply no analogy
competent to make an injunction of what in any ordinary understanding
of the word is not one.
Id at 257-58.
41. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
42. Id at 177-78.
43. Id at 182.
44. Id The Court found that Enelow-Ettleson was outmoded in the new system,
where law and equity were merged. Id at 184.
45. The Court concluded that "it is better judicial practice to follow the prece-
dents which limit appealability of interlocutory orders." Id at 185. Courts and
commentators usually view Baltimore Contractors as firmly establishing the Ene/ow-
Ettleson rule. See, e.g., Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817, 820
(7th Cir. 1981); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, SUpra note
39, § 3923. This view is only partially correct. In Baltimore Contractors, the Court
committed itself only to the cases limiting appeal, like Morgantown, and not those
expanding it, like Endow and Ettleson. 348 U.S. at 185. The decision strongly dis-
couraged piecemeal interlocutory review, and therefore, it is anomalous to interpret
it as sanctioning the use of Enelow-Ettleson to appeal orders otherwise not subject to
review. Nevertheless, the case has been read as keeping alive both lines of cases. See
1022 [Vol. 48
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Commentators and lower courts have uniformly assailed the Enelow-
Ettleson rule.4 6 Their primary contention has been that the distinction be-
tween law and equity makes little sense in a system based on merger.4 7 Re-
sults depend on characterizing a case as legal or equitable rather than on
the efficiency of allowing interlocutory appeal. 48  Because the rule is
phrased in terms of a prior determination, review depends on the "pure
fortuity of the race to the courthouse."4 9
The courts have grudgingly continued to apply the Enelow-Ettleson rule
because the Supreme Court has not reconsidered Baltimore Contractors.5"
Some courts reason that Congress has implicitly approved the rule by fail-
ing to abrogate the older decisions.5 ' Arguably, the Ene/ow-Ettleson rule
9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[3] (2d
ed. 1982).
46. See, e.g., 9J. MOORE, B. WARD, & J. LUCAS, supra note 45, 110.20[3]; 16
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 39, § 3923. One
court has suggested that the rule has been criticized by nearly every court and com-
mentator that has considered it. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam
Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1981).
47. The Mirosofiware court observed that the Ene/ow-Ettleson rule has "outlived
the fine distinctions between law and equity." 686 F.2d at 535. See also Baltimore
Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181-83 (1955); City of Morgantown v. Royal
Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257 (1955); Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., 593 F.2d 1266, 1269
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Hussain v. Bache & Co., 562 F.2d 1287,
1289 & nn.l-3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wallace v. Norman Indus., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th
Cir. 1972); Penoro v. Reders A/B Disa, 376 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 852 (1967); Travel Consultants v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 334,
336 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Glen Oaks Utils. v. City of
Houston, 280 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1960).
48. In cases with mixed legal and equitable claims, appeal depends on whether
the request for equitable relief is "merely incidental." See 16 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 39, § 3923.
49. Chapman v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 401 F.2d 626,
628 (4th Cir. 1968).
50. See Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 891 (1962). Three cases are sometimes read as not following the rule in
allowing appeal: Glen Oaks Utils. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960);
City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Jewell v. Davies, 102 F.2d 670 (6th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952). But see Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303
F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.) (appeals in Glen Oaks and Thibodaux were justified on other
grounds), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962). Jewell did not follow the Enelow-Ettleson
rule and appeal should not have been allowed under any theory. For the flaw in
the court's reasoning, see note 101 infra.
51. See, e.g., J.M. Huber &Co. v. M/V Plym, 468 F.2d 166, 167 (4th Cir. 1972)
("Were the decisional slate clean we would have no hesitancy in discarding this
fictional distinction and upholding appealability, but it would appear that the solu-
tion must come from the Congress or upon reconsideration by the Supreme
Court."); see a/so Hartford Fin. Sys. v. Florida Software Servs., 712 F.2d 724, 726-27
1983]
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once was necessary to evade the rigid finality requirements. Following Bal-
timore Contractors, though, Congress passed the Interlocutory Appeals Act,52
relaxing the final judgment rule. Because it may allow interlocutory appeal
in deserving cases, the Act may obviate the need for Enelow-Ettleson."
Perhaps the Enelow-Ettleson rule should be rejected,54 but Mticrosj? ware
theoretically followed long-standing Supreme Court precedent by applying
the rule. Nevertheless, the court of appeals has given the rule unprece-
dented breadth by using it to allow interlocutory appeal from orders deny-
ing stays. Courts have uniformly found that stay orders in actions pending
judgment in concurrent state legal proceedings are not appealable interloc-
utory orders.55 If the state court action is legal, the federal stay does not
(1st Cir. 1983); Wallace v. Norman Indus., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972); Chap-
man v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 401 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir.
1968); Travel Consultants v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 334, 338 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). The theory of legislation by inaction is
not persuasive. It not only assumes that Congress is aware of the problem, but that
there are no other reasons why it has failed to act. See Grouvard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 67, 70 (1946) (inaction may indicate congressional desire to leave the
problem fluid rather than adoption by silence); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181-82, 254-55 (1975).
52. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1976)) (allows permissive appeal of interlocutory orders, subject to dis-
trict and appellate court approval). For the text of the statute and its application to
stays in concurrent proceedings, see note 90 infra.
53. See Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1966). Congress
did not have the Enelow-Ettleson rule particularly in mind when it passed § 1292(b).
See S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5255.
54. See 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD, & J. LUCAS, supra note 45, 1 110.20[3] ("It is
hoped that the Supreme Court will accept the first opportunity offered to decide
that the reason for the Enelow-Ettleson rule is no more."); 16 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 39, § 3923 ("If the question can
again be brought before the Supreme Court, it should reject the historic analogy
out of hand.").
55. See Andrews v. Southern Discount of Ga., 662 F.2d 722, 724 (1lth Cir.
1981); D.K. Jensenius v. Texaco, 639 F.2d 1342, 1343 (5th Cir. 1981); Amy v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 266 F.2d 869, 879 (3d Cir. 1959). In Jackson Brewing Co. v.
Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962), the defendant
sought a stay to await judgment in the parties' state court breach of contract action.
In holding that the stay was not an appealable interlocutory order, the court
observed:
The stay in this case was not granted to permit the prior determination of
an equitable defense or counterclaim asserted by the appellee; rather, the
District Court stayed proceedings until the pending law action between
the parties could be finally determined. The state action involved simply
a legal claim for breach of contract, and it presented essentially the same
legal issues as were raised in the pleadings in the federal action.
Id at 846. Microsofjware is virtually identical to Jackson Brewing, except that the
1024 [Vol. 48
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permit prior determination of an equitable defense or counterclaim, 56 If
there is no equitable defense5 7 to support the fiction that equity has en-
joined a proceeding at law, the stay order or denial is not equivalent to an
injunction under section 1292(a) (1). 58
Mirosoftware should have been no exception. Ontel sought a stay of
the federal proceedings not to allow prior determination of an equitable
defense, but to await judgment in a state action at law.59 The court of
appeals found that the federal action was legal, and concluded that the
state and federal actions were virtually identical. 60 Thus, logic would indi-
cate that the state action must have been legal as well. Since the stay order
would not have permitted prior determination of an equitable defense, the
district court's order was not a denial of an injunction under section
1292(a)(1). 6 '
latter involved granting, rather than denying the stay. Since Enelow-Ettleson and
§ 1292(a)(1) are phrased in terms of granting or denying stays or injunctions, the
distinction is not determinative. See Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659
F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cummings, C.J.). The difference may be significant
under § 1291. See note 91 supra. Microsoflware cited no case allowing appeal from a
denial of a stay in a federal action pending completion of state legal proceedings.
Cases involving orders denying stays pending other types of legal proceedings gener-
ally deny appeal. See, e.g., Castahno v. Jackson Marine, 650 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir.
1981) (legal action pending in England); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
562 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1977) (court of claims action pending); Anderson v.
United States, 520 F.2d 1027, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1975) (bankruptcy action pending);
Wallace v. Norman Indus., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972) (other federal action
pending); Ephraim Freightways v. Red Ball Motor Freight, 376 F.2d 40, 41 (10th
Cir.) (administrative action pending), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
56. Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 891 (1962).
Where a court stays proceedings at law to permit the progress of another
action at law, the law/equity distinction does not come into play, for the
action is viewed simply as a court's control of its own docket. Since the
stay in such a case is not equitable in origin, the order is not regarded as
an injunction.
Limbach Co. v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 544 F.2d 1104, 1107 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977).
57. A defense is equitable under the Ene/ow-Ettleson rule if the defendant is enti-
tled to have it determined in equity while the law action is enjoined, or could main-
tain a bill in equity on the averments. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S.
379, 383 (1934). Ontel raised no such defense.
58. See Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md.
410, -, 456 A.2d 371, 374-75 (1983) (collecting federal and state cases).
59. 686 F.2d at 533.
60. Id at 533-34.
61. Compare the majority's holding with Judge Doyle's dissent, id at 540 (no
equitable defense asserted), and Judge Hoffman's refusal to stay pending appeal,
Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp, No. 81 C 1014, excerpt of proceedings
at 5 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1981) (clear that New York action solely one for damages
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The analogy to a bill of peace62 does not buttress the holding. Equity
may issue a bill of peace to enjoin actions at law, but neither the state or
federal court in Microsoflware exercised equitable jurisdiction. Even if equi-
table jurisdiction were involved, a bill of peace would not have been appro-
priate. A bill of peace should issue only if the complainant has previously
established a right at law, or the persons controverting his rights are so nu-
merous that the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits.63
Microsoflware falls into neither class. Since the state action was pending,
Ontel had established no right at law. There were only two parties to both
actions, so there was no risk of multiple suits.6 4 Absent vexation, equity
does not enjoin legal actions merely because other suits are pending.65
The court also noted that the need to control duplicative litigation in-
voked the equitable discretion of the trial court.6 6 Preventing wasteful law-
suits does raise equitable considerations, such as conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive litigation disposition.6 7 Nevertheless, a court
exercising equitable discretion does not necessarily determine an equitable
defense.68 All concurrent proceedings raise equitable considerations, yet
few concern equitable defenses.
and thus legal). See also Texaco v. Cottage Hill Operating Co., 709 F.2d 452, 454
(7th Cir. 1983) (declining to extend Microsofiware reasoning where state action did
not include identical parties and issues); Highfield Water Co. v. Washington
County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md. 410,-, 456 A.2d 371, 374 (1983) (recognizing that
Microsofiware is against the weight of authority). The Seventh Circuit's expansion
of the rule is contrary to the principle that Enelow-Ettleson and § 1292(a)(1) should
be narrowly construed. See Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817,
819 (7th Cir. 1981); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d
1244, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
62. "Equity will interfere to restrain proceedings at law upon a bill in the na-
ture of a bill of peace, whose object is to restrain useless and vexatious litigation and
to prevent a multiplicity of suits." 686 F.2d at 536 (quoting I J. HIGH, HIGH ON
INJUNCTIONS § 61 (4th ed. 1905)).
63. 686 F.2d at 536. See J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 253 (5th ed.
1941).
64. The theory justifying equitable intervention is that the remedy at law is
inadequate because of the multiplicity of suits. There was no risk of multiple suits
in Microsofiware, either in terms of parties or issues. There are only two potential
parties to both actions, and the conclusion of the state or federal action would
merge or bar the parties' claims. See note 182 infra.
65. See Murphy v. Cadell, 2 B. & P. 137, 106 Eng. Rep. 1200 (K.B. 1800).
There was no evidence in Microsoftware that the federal action was vexatious. It
appears that MCS chose the Illinois federal forum for its convenience and counsel's
familiarity with local judges. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 6, 1982, at 32, col. 4 (statement of
J. Scotellaro, MCS counsel). Compare Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins.
Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979) (federal action dilatory and vexatious).
66. 686 F.2d at 536.
67. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952).
68. 686 F.2d at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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B. Practical Reasons for Allowing Appeal
The Seventh Circuit augmented its analysis of equity's history with
three practical reasons for allowing appeal: (1) a denial of a stay is effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment; (2) a stay saves judicial
resources by preventing multiple proceedings; and (3) appeal was necessary
to settle intra-circuit conflicts over the scope of the district courts' discretion
to stay parallel proceedings.
6 9
All orders unreviewable on appeal from final judgment do not neces-
sarily require interlocutory review. 70 The need for appellate review must be
balanced against the policy favoring appeal only from final judgments.7 '
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789,72 the congressional mandate has been to
have entire cases decided in single appeals following judgment on the mer-
its. 73 Section 1292(a)(1) is only a limited exception to this rule, allowing
appeal of orders with "serious, perhaps irreparable consequences" that can
be challenged effectively only by immediate appeal. 4 Only an order that
affects the merits of a claim or passes on the legal sufficiency of a request for
an injunction has serious, perhaps irreparable consequences. 75 The order in
Microsofiware met neither requirement because it only moved the litigation
toward final judgment.76 Therefore, the policy discouraging piecemeal re-
view should have precluded appeal.77
69. Id at 534-35.
70. Cf Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (inability to
take effective appeal after final judgment is only one factor in allowing collateral
order interlocutory appeal).
71. See Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
72. Ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)).
73. See Carson v. American Brands, 450 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1981); Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978); Switzerland Cheese
Ass'n v. E. Home's Mkt., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966); Andrews v. United States, 373
U.S. 334, 340 (1963); Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-82
(1955); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940).
74. Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 180-81 (1955). See also
Carson v. American Brands, 450 U.S. 79, 84, 85 (1981); Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v.
E. Home's Mkt., 385 U.S. 23, 24-25 (1966).
75. See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).
76. The court found that the stay issue was completely separate from the mer-
its. 686 F.2d at 534.
77. It has been suggested that if the Enelow-Ettleson rule is satisfied, serious,
perhaps irreparable consequences are not required before appeal is allowed. See
White v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1981); Com-
ment, Arbitration or Litigation, United States District Court Orders Resolving the Issue
Should Be Appealable Under 28' US C § 1292, 2 U. ILL. L.F. 338, 345 (1973). The
Court has held, however, that § 1292(a)(1) does not reach orders that "in no way
touch on the merits of the claim but only relate to pretrial procedures." Switzer-
land Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's Mkt., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966). While an order grant-
ing a stay arguably reaches the merits because it may effectively put the plaintiff
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The court of appeals also urged that the "'unjustified wast[ing] of
scarce judicial resources' has often been a factor in deciding whether to al-
low interlocutory appeal, ' 78 and concluded that appeal was necessary to
prevent duplication between the state and federal court.79 The interlocu-
tory appeal issue cannot be viewed solely in terms of allocating cases be-
tween state and federal courts; it also involves division of labor between
federal district and appellate courts. In general, the cost associated with an
interlocutory appeal is that the appeal may be unnecessary if the trial court
was correct. The cost of not allowing appeal is that the trial may be unnec-
essary if the trial court was in error. If the cost of an unnecessary appeal is
equivalent to an unnecessary trial, interlocutory appeals should be allowed
only if trial courts err more than they are correct. Since trial courts are
sustained far more often than they are reversed, the finality rule promotes
efficiency.
80
The court of appeals could only speculate that the waste of duplicative
state and federal trials more than offset the inconvenience of interlocutory
appeal. The federal action was unnecessary only if the state court lawsuit
would result in a judgment on the merits, barring the federal claim.8 1
When the court of appeals granted the stay, it had no idea whether the New
York action would reach a judgment on the merits. On the contrary, since
the state court's jurisdiction was being appealed when A'icrosofiware was de-
cided, 2 there was reason to believe the New York action would not be res
out of court, an order advancing the case to trial does not. Since an order denying a
stay request is equivalent to the latter, it would not have serious, perhaps irrepara-
ble consequences. Cf Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Corp., 651 F.2d 1244,
1248-49 (8th Cir. 1981) (consequences test justified applying the Enelow-Ettleson rule
narrowly).
78. 686 F.2d at 534 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368, 378 (1981)). In context, the Firestone quote reads:
But interlocutory orders are not appealable "on the mere grounds that
they may be erroneous." Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not
only would constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources, but
would transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license
for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291.
449 U.S. at 378 (citation omitted). The Cohen (collateral order) exception to the
finality rule is discussed in note 91 infra. In Firestone, the Court was concerned with
narrowing exceptions to the finality rule to avoid wasteful interlocutory review.
Microsofiware moves in the opposite direction, disregarding the finality rule, impos-
ing additional burdens on appellate courts.
79. 686 F.2d at 534. The federal trial can hardly be viewed as unjustified if it
guarantees MCS the right to a federal forum. See text accompanying notes 135-36
in/a.
80. J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 863 (1981). See also
Microsofiware, 686 F.2d at 540-41 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
81. 686 F.2d at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
82. See note 10 supra.
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judicata. If so, the federal trial would not be unnecessary. 83
Even if permitting appeal in Microsojware saved resources, this gain
does not justify a general rule allowing appeal from interlocutory orders
denying stays. The issue transcends the confines of a single case in which
the court of appeals decides that a district court erred in denying a stay.
84
It is doubtful that district courts generally err more often then not in deny-
ing stay orders.85 In the unlikely event this is true, it is for Congress and not
the Seventh Circuit to expand interlocutory review.8 6
Finally, the Microsofiware court reasoned that interlocutory review was
necessary to harmonize conflicts among lower court orders concerning stays
in concurrent proceedings.87 The court traced this conflict to its previous
failure to provide guidance.8 8 Interlocutory review is necessary to direct the
lower courts only if the court of appeals cannot otherwise review stay or-
ders. Orders granting or denying stays can be appealed through means
other than section 1292(a)(1), including mandamus,89 permissive interlocu-
83. 686 F.2d at 541 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
84. Id. Accord Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1955).
85. 686 F.2d at 541 (Doyle, J., dissenting). Lower courts are afforded great
discretion to deny stays, but only exceptional circumstances justify granting a stay.
See text accompanying note 136 infra.
86. See Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1955). Ad
hoc changes in appellate jurisdiction encourage interlocutory appeals, wasting time
and money. Thus Congress, not the courts, should "weigh the competing interests
of the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of
savings in time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on the liti-
gants." Id. at 181. See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 945 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decisions that create
uncertainty about appealability result in colorable appeals which delay and disrupt
proceedings).
87. 686 F.2d at 535. The court compared the district court's order below;
Browning v. United States Movilyn Corp., 83 F.R.D. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1979); and
Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, 79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Wis. 1978) with
Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 530 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill. 1982); and Bur-
rows v. Sebastian, 448 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The conflict was only tempo-
rary. See note 92 infra.
88. 686 F.2d at 535.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) (appellate courts may issue writs of mandamus
in aid of their jurisdiction). Mandamus was once an effective means to appeal stay
orders. See, e.g, Aaacon Auto Transp. v. Ninfo, 490 F.2d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1974);
Lummus Oil Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). The utility of mandamus to challenge stay orders
in diversity cases was severely undercut by Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S.
655 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Will, the Seventh Circuit issued a writ of manda-
mus to compel a district court to proceed in a case despite parallel proceedings in
state court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that mandamus is reserved for
clear and indisputable cases. Id. at 667. Since the Court also held that stay orders
in concurrent proceedings issue within the district court's discretion, the plaintiff
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tory appeal," and appeal from stays as final judgments.9 1 Moreover elimi-
whose action was stayed had no clear right to the writ. Id at 665-66. Following
Will, fewer diversity litigants are able to appeal stay orders through writs of man-
damus. See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp, 103 S. Ct.
927, 933 n.6 (1983) (court of appeals has no occasion to review through mandamus
when it can review by ordinary contemporary appeal).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides in part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order otherwise not
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order in-
volves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writ-
ing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order ....
Several courts have allowed appeal under this section of stay orders issued pending
resolution of concurrent proceedings. See, e.g., Voktas v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d
103 (7th Cir. 1982); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d
1228 (7th Cir. 1979); Lear Siegler v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964). But see
Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., No. 81 C 1014, excerpt of proceedings
at 5 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1981) (denying certification). Since § 1292(b) permits certifi-
cation only if appeal is not otherwise allowed under § 1292(a), Microsoflware implic-
itly contradicts Voktas v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1981).
Permissive interlocutory appeal is rare because it requires the consent of both the
trial and appellate courts. In fiscal year 1974, only 100 of 16,436 appeals were
certified by district courts, and the court of appeals took only half that number. C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102 (3d ed. 1976). This practice conforms
with the congresssional intent to limit permissive appeal to exceptional cases. See
H. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958); see generally Note, Section 1292(b);
Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 54 GEo. L.J. 940 (1966); Note, Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 360 (1961).
91. There is conflict over whether stays granted in concurrent proceedings are
equivalent to dismissals and thus appealable under § 1291. Initially, stays were not
equated with dismissals. See, e.g., Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 266
F.2d 869, 870 (3d Cir. 1959). Then the Supreme Court recognized that orders
could be final if they put "a party effectively out of court." Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962). In parallel proceedings
where the state defendant is the federal plaintiff, judgment on the merits in state
court may later be asserted as res judicata in the federal action. Thus, the stay of
the federal proceedings may put the plaintiff out of court. Based on this reasoning
and Idlewild, the Seventh Circuit has held that a stay may be equivalent to a dismis-
sal. See Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir.
1981) (en banc). Other circuits disagree. See, e.g., Andrews v. Southern Discount
Co. of Ga., 662 F.2d 722, 723 (11th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); D.K. Jensenius v.
Texaco, 639 F.2d 1342, 1343 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court recently decided
the issue. See notes 107-16 and accompanying text infra.
Another avenue for review under § 1291 is the collateral order exception,
which allows appeal of district court orders that (1) resolve issues completely sepa-
rate from the merits, (2) would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
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nating apparent conflicts in the lower court decisions may even be
unnecessary, since they spring from legitimate exercises of discretion. Disa-
greement within a certain range may be unavoidable.9 2 Because district
courts are closer to the facts that determine whether a stay should issue,
they may be best suited to judge the propriety of stays.93
C. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
While neither history nor practicality compel review of orders denying
stays under section 1292(a)(1), Supreme Court dictum has suggested that
stay orders may be subject to interlocutory appeal. In Will v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co.,9 the Court vacated a writ of mandamus ordering a district
court to hear a diversity action despite pending concurrent state proceed-
ings.95 The plurality observed that the "District Court's exercise of its dis-
cretion may be subject to review and modification in a proper interlocutory
judgment, and (3) conclusively determine the disputed question. See Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). In Microsojfware, the Seventh Circuit found the
order failed the third condition because the district court was free to reconsider the
order denying the stay throughout the litigation. 686 F.2d at 534. Cf. Hastings v.
Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (interim award
of attorneys' fees not appealable because court could modify the award as the ac-
tion progressed). But see Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185-86
(1955) (Black, J., dissenting) (denial of stay pending arbitration should be appeala-
ble collateral order). The Supreme Court recently decided a similar issue. See notes
110-15 and accompanying text infira.
A district court might insulate its decision to delay litigation from review by
simply postponing the trial date without formally issuing a stay order. See Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 944 (1983) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 665, 665 (1978); Evans
Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982).
92. The conflicting cases cited in Microso/?ware have been reconciled without
resort to appeal under § 1292(a)(1). Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 530 F.
Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill. 1982), was vacated and remanded by the court of appeals, 693
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982) (dismissal appealed as final judgment). Burrows v. Sebas-
tian, 448 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1978), was substantially overruled in Voktas v. Cen-
tral Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982) (permissive interlocutory appeal). The
only remaining conflict is between Microsofiware and the other Seventh Circuit
cases, and that conflict was created by the court of appeals, not the district court.
But cf. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1982)
(attempts to reconcile Microsofiware with other circuit decisions). The Microsotware
court's "guidance" is likely to confuse the district courts.
93. 686 F.2d at 541 (Doyle, J., dissenting) ("It is inherent in the enjoyment of
choice by district courts that in a batch of virtually identical cases" some courts will
grant stays while others will deny them).
94. 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opinion).
95. Id at 663.
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appeal, cf. Landis, 229 U.S. 256-259. ' ' 96 In Landis v. North American Co., 97
the district court stayed proceedings pending a decision in another federal
action between the parties.98 Neither the court of appeals9 9 nor the
Supreme Court discussed the jurisdiction issue."
Landis does not authorize interlocutory appeal from stay orders under
section 1292(a) (1) orEnelow-Ettleson, because it was decided under a special
District of Columbia statute that potentially allowed permissive appeal
from all interlocutory orders." Neither Landis nor Will should be read as
generally allowing interlocutory appeal from orders granting or denying
stays.
Following Mkirosoftware, the Supreme Court eliminated some of the un-
certainty regarding appeal of stay orders in concurrent proceedings. In
Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercuy Construction Corp., 102 the plaintiff,
Hospital, filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that its contract
dispute with the defendant, Mercury, was not subject to arbitration.'0 3
Three weeks later, Mercury filed a diversity action seeking an order compel-
ling arbitration. Finding the state and federal suits identical, the district
court stayed the federal proceedings pending judgment in the state court. 104
The Fourth Circuit assumed jurisdiction and reversed the order,0 5 and the
Supreme Court affirmed.'0 6
Although the Court did not discuss whether the order was appealable
under section 1292(a)(1)i the majority found two grounds for appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.107 First, the Court held the stay order was a final deci-
sion because it put Mercury effectively out of federal court.'0" Since both
96. Id
97. 229 U.S. 248 (1936).
98. North Am. Co. v. Landis, 85 F.2d 398, 399 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 299 U.S. 248
(1936).
99. Id
100. Landis v. North Am. Co., 229 U.S. 248, 249-50 (1936).
101. See Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 226, 31 Stat. 1225, repealed, Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 143, § 142, 63 Stat. 110. The Act was similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
except that the former did not require district court certification. One court relied
on Landis to allow appeal otherwise not permitted. See Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d
670 (6th Cir. 195 1), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952). SinceJewell did not arise under
the District of Columbia statute or its equivalent, it was incorrectly decided. See 9
J. MOORE, B. WARD, & J. LUCAS, supra note 45, 110.20[4.-3] n. 13.
102. 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
103. Id at 934.
104. Mercury Const. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memoral Hosp., 656 F.2d 933, 937
(4th Cir. 1981) (en banc), affd, 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
105. Id at 946.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 927.
107. (1976).
108. Cf. Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) (a deci-
sion is final if it puts the plaintiff "effectively out of court"). See note 91 supra.
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actions involved the same issue, the stay of the federal action eliminated
any chance of federal jurisdiction being exercised because the state court
judgment would be res judicata in the dispute.' 0 9 Alternatively, the stay
order was held appealable under the Cohen v. Benefi ial Industrial Loan
Corp. 110 collateral order exception to the finality rule. The Cohen exception,
later refined in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, "' allows appeal of orders (1)
conclusively determining a disputed question, (2) resolving an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and which are (3)
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 2 The majority
had little doubt that the order in Mercury Construction met the second and
third elements; the district court's refusal to adjudicate the matter was an
important issue completely separate from the merits, and the order would
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because of the
res judicata effect of the state court decision. 113
Thus, the" issue was whether the order conclusively determined the dis-
puted question. Although the Court conceded that the stay order was sub-
ject to reconsideration by the district judge, this was true "only in the
technical sense that every order short of a final decree is subject to reopen-
ing at the discretion of the district judge.""' 4 Finding no basis to suppose
the lower court contemplated reconsideration, the Court reasoned that the
district judge would not have granted the stay unless it expected the state
court to adequately resolve the issues."' Therefore, the order was conclu-
109. 103S. Ct. at934&n.11.
Idlewild's reasoning is limited to cases where (under Colorado River, ab-
stention, or closely similar doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all
or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum....
We do not hold that an order becomes final merely because it may have
the practical effect of allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a
common issue. We hold only that a stay order is final when the sole pur-
pose and effect of the stay is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal
court to a state court.
Id at 934-35 n. 11.
110. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
111. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
112. Id. at 468.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 935. But see id at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arbitration
issue was not "important" because the state court could have adequately resolved
it).
114. Id at 935 & n. 14. This reasoning was based on FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) which
provides:
[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties. . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry ofjudg-
ment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 935 & nn.13-14. But see id at 946 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
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sive, and all the Cohen elements were satisfied." 6
The majority viewed a stay of federal proceedings in deference to a
concurrent state court action as practically indistinguishable from a dismis-
sal. " 7 The question that Mercug Construction leaves open is whether orders
denying stays in concurrent proceedings are appealable under the collateral
order exception. The majority in Microsofiware would have applied the col-
lateral order exception but for its conclusion that the order denying the stay
did not conclusively determine the disputed question.' Following Mercury
Construction, the Seventh Circuit would, therefore, probably apply the col-
lateral order exception to orders denying stays.' 9
Notwithstanding the Microsoftware court's conclusion, orders denying
stays may not resolve important issues completely separate from the merits.
In Mercury Construction, the Court observed that the second element in the
Cohen exception is a distillation of the principle discouraging piecemeal re-
view of steps which will merge in a final judgment. 121 Unlike the stay order
in Mercury Construction, which ended consideration of the merits, the denial
of the stay in Microsoftware moved the parties toward final judgment.
Nevertheless, an order denying a stay will occasionally be unreview-
able on appeal from final judgment. Two results are possible when the stay
is refused: the state court may reach judgment on the merits first, res judi-
cata will end the federal proceeding, and there can be no effective appeal.
(order was not conclusive because it was subject to modification if progress in state
court was inadequate).
116. Id at 935.
117. Id at 934 n.8 ("substanceless distinction").
118. 686 F.2d at 534. See note 91 supra.
119. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that by the time a final judgment was
reached, "the extra resources needed to prosecute and decide two identical lawsuits
will already have been spent." 686 F.2d at 534. This conclusion was rejected in
Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md. 410, 456 A.2d
371 (1983). The parties were involved in concurrent state and federal litigation.
The state court defendant moved for a stay of proceedings on the grounds that a
federal court was exercising in rem jurisdiction over the dispute. The trial court
denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. The court of appeals, citing and
rejecting Microsofiware, held the order was not appealable as an interlocutory or
final order. The court refused to apply the collateral order exception, finding that
the order was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment:
[We do not] accept. . . the argument that review upon a final judgment
will be ineffective because [a party] must bear the cost and inconvenience
of a trial, harms that a reversal on appeal will not recompense. That [a
party] will have to bear such a burden does not present a better case for
the effective unreviewability of an order denying a disqualification than
could be made for all interlocutory orders.
Id at -, 456 A.2d at 374 (quoting Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles
Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 94, 394 A.2d 801, 806 (1978)).
120. 103 S. Ct. at 933 n.13 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
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Alternatively the federal action may proceed to judgment on the merits,
and theoretically the court of appeals could decide the action should have
been stayed, and reverse. Thus some orders denying stays could be review-
able after final judgment. The court issuing the order, however, cannot
predict whether the state court will beat the federal court to judgment, so
Cohen's applicability will be uncertain.
The issue can be analogized to appeal of orders denying motions to
dismiss. 2 ' Orders denying motions to dismiss are not final under section
1291.122 Mercuty Construction held that stay orders in concurrent proceedings
are equivalent to dismissals. Conversely, a refusal to stay could be
equivalent to a denial of a motion to dismiss, and it should not be appeala-
ble under section 1291.
The appellate review analysis in Merur Construction was a product of
the majority's strong feeling that federal courts must not abdicate jurisdic-
tion to state courts.1 23 Allowing review of orders granting stays was neces-
sary to keep open the doors of the federal courthouse.' 24 When a request
for a stay is denied, however, there is no such compulsion because the plain-
tiff is not deprived of a federal forum. Therefore, stay refusals are best ana-
lyzed as interlocutory, and should not be appealable under sections 1291 or
1292(a)(1).
II. DISCRETION TO STAY
In the second part of its decision, the Microsoflware court held that a
district court may be required to stay proceedings pending resolution of a
similar action between the parties in state courts.' 25 While the court con-
ceded that the decision to deny the stay was largely committed to the dis-
trict court's discretion,1 26 it concluded that Ontel's request should have
been granted.'
27
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
122. Spruill v. Gage, 262 F.2d 355, 356 (6th Cir. 1958). See also Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 236 (1945).
123. See 103 S. Ct. at 936-37.
124. The majority opinion conspicuously lacks the admonitions against expan-
sion of the limited exceptions to the finality rule that have characterized recent
decisions. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981)
(orders denying motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable collateral orders);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (rejecting "death knell"
exception to finality rule for orders denying class certification); see also 103 S. Ct. at
945 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (raising concern that Mercug Construction will lead to
unreasonable interference with district courts' docket control and more appeals).
125. 686 F.2d at 533, 538.
126. Id. at 537 (citing Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
127. 686 F.2d at 538.
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A. The Exceptional Circumstances Test
The court of appeals began its analysis with Colorado River Water District
v. United States. 128 In Colorado River, the government brought a federal ac-
tion seeking a declaration of water rights for itself and some Indian tribes.
A defendant in a Colorado state water court moved to join the United
States in the state proceedings so all claims could be adjudicated in a single
action."' The request was granted, and the federal action was dis-
missed."' 0 The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.13
Initially, the Court held that none of the traditional abstention doc-
trines applied. 3 ' Therefore, the issue was whether the dismissal of the fed-
eral action could be upheld solely to avoid duplication between the state
128. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
129. Colorado's seven water divisions hear claims under the Colorado Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-
92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1982). The Act established a single continuous pro-
ceeding in each division. Id § 37-92-201. Thus, the state court action was pending
when the federal suit commenced. 424 U.S. at 820.
130. 424 U.S. at 805-07.
131. Id. at 821.
132. Id. at 813. The Court recognized three abstention classes in which federal
courts could stay or dismiss proceedings pending state court action: (1) where state
law may dispose of a federal constitutional issue, see Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); (2) where difficult state law questions determine
public policy that transcends results in the case at bar, see Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); and (3) where federal jurisdiction is invoked
to restrain state criminal proceedings, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Other categories have been discussed, including a "fourth abstention doctrine,"
which recognizes a need to ease federal docket congestion, particularly when pend-
ing parallel state proceedings involve the same parties and issues as the federal ac-
tion. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976); Ashman,
Alfini, & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives On Its Current Vitality, 46 Miss.
L.J. 629 (1975); Currie, FederalJurisdiction and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CI4.
L. REV. 268 (1969); Kurland, Toward A Co-Operative Judicial Federalism; The Federal
Court Abstention Doctrines, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Recon-
sidered, 37 TEx. L. REV. 815 (1959). The American Law Institute did not recognize
this fourth abstention doctrine in its jurisdiction work. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (1969). The Senate has passed a bill establishing a Federal Jurisdiction
Review and Revision Commission to study concurrent jurisdiction problems. See S.
3123, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S1267-68 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1980)
(remarks of Senator Thurmond).
Prior to Colorado River, the trend was to recognize that district courts had broad
discretionary power to stay proceedings pending concurrent state action. See, e.g.
Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna State
Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103
(4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
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and federal courts. 33 Prior Supreme Court cases dealing with dismissals in
the context of multiple federal proceedings had held that only one of the
actions between the parties should go forward. 34 The Court, however, dis-
tinguished dismissals of federal actions in deference to state proceedings be-
cause of the rule that a pending state action is no bar to a federal court's
exercising diversity jurisdiction over a suit involving the same parties and
issues." 5 Given the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts
to exercise their jurisdiction, the Court held that only "exceptional circum-
stances" justified dismissing a federal action in deference to a pending state
133. 424 U.S. at 817.
Although this case falls within none of the abstention categories, there are
principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudica-
tion and regard for federal-state relations which govern. . . the contem-
poraneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or
by state and federal courts. These principles rest on considerations of
"[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."
Id (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0 Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952)). Some lower courts, however, view concurrent proceedings as a comity
problem. See, e.g., Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Merkle-Korff Indus., 503 F.
Supp. 168, 170 (D.N.H. 1980).
134. 424 U.S. at 817. In concurrent proceedings between federal courts, dismis-
sal of one action does not deprive the plaintiff of a federal forum. Thus, the general
rule has been to avoid duplication and let only one action proceed. See Kero-Test
Mfg. Co. v. C-0 Two Fire Equip: Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) ("the power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposi-
tion of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for coun-
sel, and for litigants"); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Seven
years after Landis, in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), the Court
reversed a decision dismissing a diversity action so that state law issues could first be
decided in state court. The Court observed:
The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal
courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to afford to
suitors an opportunity . . . to assert their rights in federal rather than in
the state courts. In the absence of some recognized public policy or de-
fined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which
would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has from the first
been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is
properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to
the rendition of a judgment.
Id at 234 (citation omitted). The Court also noted, however, that when the case
was dismissed there was no litigation pending in state court which could have re-
solved the issues presented. Id at 237. Cf PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 478
F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1973) (Meredith may have reached different result had state
court action been pending).
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suit.' 6 Factors relevant to this determination include (1) whether either
court exercised in rem jurisdiction;"3 7 (2) the inconvenience of the federal
forum;' (3) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation;" 9 and (4) the order in
which the actions were filed. 40 Dismissals must be based on the "clearest
of justifications." " '
After positing the unflagging obligation, the Court concluded that the
facts in Colorado River were exceptional because federal law encouraged reso-
lution of water disputes in comprehensive actions.' 42 Dismissal was neces-
sary to avoid piecemeal litigation. 4 '
The key to Colorado River is the virtually unflagging obligation, a duty
gleaned primarily from three cases. In the first, England v. Louisiana Slate
Board of Medical Examiners, "' the Court noted that federal courts have a
duty to exercise their jurisdiction to guarantee the right to a federal fo-
rum.' 4 5 In the second case, McClellan v. Carland,'4 6 the Court stated that
pending state proceedings were no bar to federal courts exercising diversity
136. 424 U.S. at 817. This virtually unflagging obligation phrase could be dic-
tum because it appeared "in an opinion which upheld the correctness of a district
court'sfnal decision to dismiss because of concurrent jurisdiction." Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978) (plurality opinion).
137. 424 U.S. at 817. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964);
Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).
138. 424 U.S. at 818. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
139. 424 U.S. at 818. Cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)
(federal court may dismiss declaratory judgment action in deference to concurrent
state proceeding).
140. 424 U.S. at 818. See Pacific Livestock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S.
440, 447 (1916).
141. 424 U.S. at 819.
142. Id at 819. See McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, § 208a-c, 66 Stat. 560, 562
(1952) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976)).
143. 424 U.S. at 819. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens argued that not
even that McCarran Amendment justified dismissal. They were concerned with the
peculiarly federal aspects of the case: (1) federal water law was involved; (2) the
federal government was a party; and (3) the rights of Indian tribes, traditionally
federal subjects, were implicated. Id at 825-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 826-27
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Query whether these three Justices would oppose stays in a
federal case based solely on diversity jurisdiction. Cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655 (1978) (Justices Stewart and Stevens join plurality opinion upholding
stay where jurisdiction was concurrent).
144. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). The plaintiffs brought a federal action challenging a
state law on due process grounds. The district court remitted the action to state
court for statutory interpretation, where the plaintiffs lost both the construction and
constitutional challenges. The federal court dismissed its action and the plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had a
right to a federal determination of their constitutional claim. I.d at 415.
145. Id The right is qualified: "There are fundamental objections to any con-
clusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court to
1038 [Vol. 48
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jurisdiction. 4 7 Finally, the Colorado River Court cited Cohens v. Virginia, 148
in which Chief Justice Marhsall suggested that federal courts may not de-
cline to exercise their jurisdiction. 4 9
The virtually unflagging obligation was later questioned by a plurality
of the Court in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. "' Four justices found that a
diversity litigant did not have a clear and indisputable right to federal adju-
dication of a matter subject to pending state court proceedings. 5 1 The dis-
trict court had stayed proceedings because a similar action between the
parties had been commenced in state court before the federal action was
filed. 52 Relying on Colorado River, the Seventh Circuit issued a writ of man-
damus ordering the district court to rescind the stay. 5 3 The Supreme
Court reversed, stating that the decision to defer to the concurrent state
proceedings was committed to the district court's discretion. 5 4 Because
mandamus is reserved for clear and indisputable causes, 155 it was not an
appropriate tool for overriding the district court's discretion.
56
consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled, through no fault of his
own, to accept a state court determination of those claims." Id. (footnote omitted).
146. 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
147. Id at 282. The Colorado River Court stated this as the general rule. 424 U.S.
at 818. This "rule," however, is not supported by the facts in McClellan, where the
court stayed proceedings and directed the parties to commence an action in state
court; no action was pending when the federal suit was initiated. McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U.S. at 281. (Actually, the McClellan Court had affidavits from the
lower court indicating that a state action was pending, if not completed. Neverthe-
less, the Court found that the statements were not properly part of the record, and
decided that case as if no other action was pending. Id at 283.) The distinction is
important, given Colorado River's recognition that the order of proceedings is a factor
in determining exceptional circumstances. 424 U.S. at 818.
148. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1812).
149. Id at 404. "It may be true that there was never such a rule uniformly
applied in the federal courts. It is clear that there is no such rule today." C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976). The abstention doctrines
are plainly inconsistent with Chief Justice Marshall's suggestion that the federal
courts must always exercise their jurisdiction. See note 132 supra; see also Meredith
v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1943) (lengthy list of areas in which the
federal courts defer to state courts).
150. 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opinion).
151. Id at 664, 667-70.
152. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 560 F.2d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437
U.S. 655 (1978).
153. 560 F.2d at 795.
154. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. at 662-63. The district court was not
compelled to exercise its jurisdiction because the matter may have been settled
more expeditiously in state court.
155. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).
156. 437 U.S. at 667. After the Supreme Court reversed, the Seventh Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of Colorado River.
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Although McClellan v. Carland seemed to compel issuance of the writ,
the plurality distinguished the case as outdated, 5 7 given the intervening
increase in federal-state concurrent proceedings, ' 58 citing Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance. ,51 In Brillhart, the Court upheld the stay of a federal declaratory
judgment action concerning a matter pending in state court. After noting
that declaratory judgment jurisdiction is discretionary, ' 60 the Brillhart
Court observed:
Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a
federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where an-
other suit is pending in state court presenting the same issues not
governed by federal law. Gratuitous interference with the orderly
and comprehensive disposition of state court litigation should be
avoided. "
Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12, 14 (7th Cir. 1978). The district court
found four reasons why Colorado River did not prohibit the stay: (1) the suit was
vexatious; (2) Colorado River applied only to dismissals, not to stays; (3) the stay was
within the bounds of discretion; and (4) the federal plaintiff had waived the right to
a federal forum by failing to remove the state court action. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v.
American Mut. Rein. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 863-64 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd, 600 F.2d
1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
157. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. at 663. Justice Rehnquist also distin-
guished McClellan on a narrow procedural ground. Id at n.6 (issuing a writ of man-
damus is not the same as issuing an order to show cause why the writ should not
issue). The dissent, without elaborating, termed this treatment a "flouting" and
"disregard" of McClellan. Id at 670 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Diversity cases are a substantial part of the burgeoning federal caseload.
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 366 (1981); Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not-A Consideration of
Federal and StateJurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 895 (1981); Sheran & Utter, State
Cases Belong In State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1978). Congress has consid-
ered but failed to pass several bills restricting diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., H.R.
6816, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 1046, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
159. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
160. Id at 494 ("Although the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under
the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 400, it was under no compul-
sion to exercise that jurisdiction."). The Declaratory Judgments Act, now codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), provides that "any court of the United States . . . maY
declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party." (emphasis added).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (diversity jurisdiction) ("district courts shall have
original jurisdiction") (emphasis added).
161. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. at 495. Will's dissenters took umbrage
at the plurality's application of Brillhart outside declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
1437 U.S. at 670-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Powell, and Marshall found that the stay was inappropriate because, in-
ter alia, the securities claims in Will involved exclusive federal jurisdiction under 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Perhaps some of the dis-
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The Will plurality also distinguished Colorado River as applying only to
dismissals, not to stays. Since the stay could be rescinded if the district
court found that the state court could not completely resolve the issues, the
Court reasoned the stay was not equivalent to final dismissal.
16 2
The four justice dissent in Will contended that the circumstances were
not exceptional.' 6 3 Justice Blackmun cast the swing vote, concurring on a
narrow procedural ground." 6 In dictum, however, he aligned himself with
the dissenters.' 65 Will is criticized for adding confusion to an amorphous
area of the law.
166
B. The Test Applied in Microsof/ware
Microsoftware must be analyzed in this maze of dicta and distinctions.
The court of appeals noted that several factors in Micros-oftware comported
with Colorado River's exceptional circumstances test.1 67 The court found
that the federal forum in Illinois was inconvenient because it forced parties,
attorneys, and witnesses to commute from the state court action in New
York. " There was also good reason to avoid piecemeal litigation because
both lawsuits involved the same contract, parties, and issues.' 69 Finally, the
court found that the federal action should be stayed because the state action
was filed first. Since the New York and federal courts were equally compe-
162. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. at 665.
163. Id at 672-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The district court
had issued the stay before Colorado River was decided, and Justice Blackmun felt that
the Seventh Circuit should have remanded the case to the district court for recon-
sideration instead of issuing the writ.
165. Justice Blackmun quoted the passage from Brillhart set forth in text accom-
panying note 161 supra. Id. at 663 n.*.
166. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co., v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859,
864 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979); H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 313 (Supp. 1981); 17 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4247
(Supp. 1982). The division of the Court in Will has caused some lower courts to
treat Colorado River as continuing in full force. See, e.g., Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin
Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 982); Voktas v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d
103, 105 (7th Cir. 1981); Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d
531, 539 (7th Cir. 1982) (Doyle, J., dissenting). But see Microsoftware Computer
Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 1982); Zellen v. Second New Haven
Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D. Conn. 1978) (rely on Will plurality opinion).
167. 686 F.2d at 538.
168. Id The dissent found no clear balance of convenience to the New York
forum. Id at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
169. Id at 538. The district court had found that sharing discovery between the
two actions could relieve some of the burden of trying the suits simultaneously.
Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., No. 81 C 1014, excerpt of proceedings
at 6 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1981). The court of appeals found this savings was minimal.
686 F.2d at 534.
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tent to resolve the dispute, allowing the federal action to proceed would
have been "a grand waste of efforts."' 0
The Seventh Circuit also considered a factor not expressly listed in the
Colorado River exceptional circumstances test: whether there was any "fed-
eral interest" in the case.' 7 ' The case presented neither a federal question
nor justification for diversity jurisdiction. The court observed that diversity
jurisdiction was based on the need for out-of-state plaintiffs to sue state resi-
dents in neutral forums.' 7 2 MCS, an Illinois corporation, escaped no bias
by filing an action in Chicago. Consequently, the majority found that the
exercise of federal jurisdiction was unwarranted. 73
Although Microsofiware did not present the clear justification Colorado
River requires for dismissals of concurrent proceedings, 174 two factors may
170. 686 F.2d at 538.
171. Id
172. Id See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (3d ed. 1976).
173. 686 F.2d at 537. The court also noted that MCS could have removed the
New York action if it were concerned with prejudice in the state courts. Id
174. The discussion of whether diversity jurisdiction was warranted is the most
novel aspect of the opinion. It is normally not suggested that a diversity plaintiff
must show bias as a condition to filing in federal court. Comment, Federal Stays and
Dismissals In Deference To Parallel State Proceedings; The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 641, 665 (1977). The closest precedent is the Prejudice or Local Influ-
ence Act of 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558. This law required state court defendants
seeking removal to file affidavits stating that they believed that prejudice or local
influence would deny them justice in the state courts. This requirement was re-
pealed by the Act ofJan. 20, 1914, ch. 11, 38 Stat. 278. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450
(1976) (no showing of prejudice required for removal). The mere absence of local
prejudice does not justify denying the plaintiff a federal forum:
It is true that [in] Colorado River. . .federal jurisdiction was based on the
presence of a federal question, rather than diversity of citizenship. . . and
that the diversity jurisdiction is increasingly embattled. It is based on a
concern that many think outmoded (the danger of prejudice in state court
toward out-of-state litigants), and it is a drain on federal judicial resources
at a time when the federal courts are groaning under an unprecedented
case load. But until Congress decides to alter or eliminate diversity juris-
diction, we are not free to treat the diversity litigant as . . .second class.
Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1982).
Microsofiware presented no exceptional circumstances. The result was based solely
on judicial economy, which alone is insufficient to justify the stay. See id at 716-18;
Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 538-40 (Doyle, J., dissent-
ing). Had the circumstances in Microsofiware truly been exceptional, they would
have only allowed the district court to grant the stay, not the court of appeals.
Since the district court denied the stay, it exercised its discretion in a conservative
manner, taking jurisdiction obedient to its unflagging obligation. Nor is the court
of appeals' holding supported by the more liberal discretion standard advocated by
the Will plurality. Will held that the decision to defer to parallel state proceedings
was committed to the district court's discretion. 437 U.S. at 665. The Seventh
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distinguish these cases. Colorado River applied to dismissals, not to stays,
and, unlike the federal plaintiffs in Colorado River, MCS waived an opportu-
nity to remove the state proceedings to federal court.
Where the concern is for the plaintiffs right to a federal forum, there is
an arguable difference between stays and dismissals. A dismissal puts the
parties out of court, and unless the plaintiff refiles the action, the federal
court will not exercise jurisdiction. A stay, in contrast, merely delays the
exercise of federal jurisdiction because the court retains control over the
litigation, ready to decide the case if the state court does not fully resolve
the dispute. The distinction seems well suited to Microsofiware because the
Seventh Circuit ordered the stay on the condition that it terminate, for ex-
ample, if the New York action was dismissed for defective service of pro-
cess.' 75 Thus, although the district court would not immediately try the
merits, it retained jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
This distinction, recognized in traditional abstention cases,' 76 was
adopted by the plurality in Wil. '77 Because the stay in Wil left the district
court free to reactivate the federal action if state court progress was inade-
quate, the Court found that "deferral was not equivalent to dismissal."'
' 78
On remand, the district court agreed: Colorado River concerned a dismissal
of federal litigation, "clos[ing] the door of the federal courthouse . . .
whereas this federal forum remains available to the litigants upon a show-
ing that the state court is unable to adjudicate all relevant issues prop-
erly."'' 9 Other lower courts have followed the same reasoning.' 80 If the
Circuit did not find the district court abused its discretion. Rather, the court noted
that it did not "mean to criticize the care with which the district court reached its
decision." 686 F.2d at 537. This statement implies that the court has taken the
unprecedented step of narrowing the discretion of the district court's to deny stays,
virtually opposite from the Colorado River holding that district courts have only lim-
ited discretion to grant stays.
175. 686 F.2d at 538 n.7.
176. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) (Pullman stay postpones,
but does not abdicate, the exercise of federal jurisdiction).
177. 437 U.S. at 665.
178. Id
179. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 863
(N.D. Ill. 1978), aft'd, 600 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1979). Although Colorado River con-
sistently referred to dismissal rather than "stay," the Court relied on one case in-
volving a stay, McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910). See note 147 supra.
Although the distinction between stays and dismissals was not expressly recognized
in Microso/?ware, it had been adopted by both members of the majority in prior
cases: Judge Bauer, in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 n.5 (7th Cir.
1978), and Chief Judge Cummings, in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut.
Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234-35 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1979).
180. See, e.g., Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981); Augus-
tin v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1975); McGregor Land Co. v.
Meguiar, 521 F.2d 822, 824 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1975); Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 521 F.2d 817, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1975); Carr v. Grace, 516 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir.
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virtually unflagging obligation is imposed to assure plaintiffs a federal fo-
rum, a stay does not necessarily deny this choice.
This reasoning has been criticized.' In most cases where federal pro-
ceedings are stayed, the parties and issues in the state and federal actions
are similar. The federal courts defer anticipating state court judgments
that will later be asserted as res judicata in the federal action, obviating the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. 82 Thus, the plaintiff is effectively out of
federal court when the stay is granted.' 3 Moreover, the analogy to stays in
traditional abstention cases is imperfect because those stays are granted an-
ticipating the parties will return to federal court."4
In AMicrosofiware, the New York action might have been dismissed for
defective service of process, and since there would be no judgment on the
merits, the federal court would face a full trial. Therefore, the stay may not
have been equivalent to a dismissal. When the Seventh Circuit ordered the
stay, it could not predict whether the state result would eventually be as-
serted as res judicata in the federal action.' 5 Thus, the stay could be
equated with a dismissal only when judgment on the merits is reached in
state court.1 6 Nevertheless, since the concern in Colorado River was guaran-
1975); Shareholders Management Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1971);
Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 756-58 (7th Cir. 1970); see generaly
Note, The Vitality of Stays of Federal Actions Pending the Outcome of Parallel State Litiga-
tion, 54 CH. KENT L. REV. 614 (1977) (Colorado River applies only to dismissals).
181. See, e.g., 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 166, § 4247.
182. See, e.g., Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir.
1982); Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d at 534; Ungar v.
Issais, 59 F.R.D. 1396 (S.D.N.Y.), af7'd without opinion, 486 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1973);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 15, 86 (1976).
183. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982);
17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 166, § 4247; Ashman, Alfini,
& Shapiro, FederalAbstention; New Perspectives on Its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629,
639 (1975); Currie, Federal Jurisdiction and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 268, 317 (1969).
184. See, e.g., Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 173 (1942); Railroad
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941);see also England v. Louisiana
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
185. 686 F.2d at 536. That jurisdiction was doubtful may have justified deny-
ing, rather than granting the stay. In Adolph Coors Co. v. Davenport Mach. &
Foundry Co., 89 F.R.D. 148 (D. Colo. 1981), the district court denied a request for a
stay in concurrent proceedings because the federal plaintiff/state defendant was
challenging jurisdiction in a state court appeal. Since it was uficlear whether the
state courts would completely resolve the dispute because of the doubtful jurisdic-
tion, the court felt that the federal action should go forward. Id at 153.
186. See Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 226 U.S. 869 (2d Cir. 1959). InAmy,
the plaintiff appealed a stay order on the theory that it was equivalent to a dismis-
sal. The court dismissed the appeal:
The plaintiff-appellant argues that the order appealed from is more than a
mere postponement of a trial for good cause but is in substance a perma-
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teeing a federal forum, perhaps any doubt should be resolved in the plain-
tiff's favor, and the stay equated with a dismissal. 187
Even if stays are equated with the abdication of federal jurisdiction,
they may be justified where a state defendant/federal plaintiff has waived
an opportunity to remove the state court proceedings to federal court.' 8
Because MCS could have removed the New York action,"8 9 the Seventh
Circuit observed that "any interest MCS had in a federal forum could have
been satisfied by removing the [state court] action instead of creating a sec-
ond one."'" Removal would have been ideal because it would have as-
sured MOS a federal forum without creating wasteful concurrent
nent stay since the conclusion of the State court litigations will in all
probability render the suit at bar resjdicata and that therefore the stay
order is tantamount to a dismissal . . . .We cannot say that the order
appealed frolm will surely result in the case becoming resjudicata by reason
of an adjudication of the case or cases now pending in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas. The cause. . . might be dismissed by the court for reasons not
related to the merits of the action.
Id at 871.
187. One problem is reconciling the treatment of stays in concurrent proceed-
ings under Colorado River with allowing appeal under § 1291. Compare 16 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3923 (1977) (a court's stay of its own proceedings should generally not be
appealable) with 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4247 (1978) (a federal court's stay because of a pending state pro-
ceeding is equivalent to a dismissal). It is contradictory to equate a stay in concur-
rent proceedings as equivalent to a dismissal, yet deny appeal under § 1291. The
Seventh Circuit seems to be consistent on this point because stays are equated with
dismissals under Colorado River and for appeal under Section 1291. See Evans
Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co, 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982); Drexler v. South-
west Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
188. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982).
189. 686 F.2d at 536; Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp. No. 81 C
1014, excerpt of proceedings at 4-5 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1981). See generaly 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1976) (allows removal of diversity cases). But cf Colonial Bank & Trust
Co. v. Cahill, 424 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (N.D. Ill. 1976); (removal privilege may be
waived); Le Manquais v. Glick, 17 F. Supp. 347, 349-50 (W.D. Tex. 1936) (same).
190. 686 F.2d at 537. The court did not discuss why MCS failed to remove, but
it seems MCS was motivated by choice of forum. In a removal case, venue in the
federal case is the district in which the state action was pending. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1976). Therefore, if MCS had removed, it would have tried the case in
federal court in New York. By filing as plaintiff, though, MCS expected a trial in
Chicago. It appears that MCS did not want to litigate in federal court as much as
it wanted to litigate in Chicago. See note 65 supra.
Removal would not have prevented MCS from challenging service of process,
for only subject matter jurisdiction is derivative in removal cases. See Witherow v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1976); Maloney v. Iowa-Ill.
Gas & Elec. Co., 88 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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There are two ways that the failure to remove may justify the stay
order in Microsoftware. First, Colorado River emphasized the plaintiffs right
to a federal forum. The unflagging obligation and exceptional circum-
stances tests were designed to protect this right. But if the federal plaintiff
has foregone an opportunity to secure a federal forum, these concerns are
not as compelling. Given the removal option, the question in Microsoflware
was not whether MCS shall have access to federal court, but which federal
court: Chicago or New York. When the choice is between two federal fo-
rums, judicial economy is decisive, for there is no question of depriving the
plaintiff of his federal forum. By waiving the removal opportunity, MCS
chose not to litigate in federal court.'9 2
The removal issue can also be analyzed within Colorado River's excep-
tional circumstances framework. The right to remove is burdened by statu-
tory restrictions.' 93 If state court defendants have unrestrained access to
federal court as plaintiffs, the restrictions are only a trap for the unwary;
any procedural default preventing removal could be cured by simply filing
a second action in federal court.1 94 Staying the state defendant/federal
191. 686 F.2d at 537 (citing Burrows v. Sebastian, 448 F. Supp. 51, 53 (N.D. Ill.
1978)). InBurrows, the plaintiff filed an action in state court and subsequently filed
a second action in federal court. The federal proceedings were stayed, the district
court holding that the exceptional circumstances test did not apply where the fed-
eral proceedings were repetitive (plaintiff files both federal and state actions) rather
than reactive (state court defendant files federal action). The stay simply placed
the plaintiff in the position of having to decide in which of the two forums to pursue
his claim. Id at 53. Burrows was followed in Yseuta v. Parris, 486 F. Supp. 127,
128-29 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (court made no mention of Colorado River); distinguished in
Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982); and
substantially overruled in Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103, 107-09
(7th Cir. 1982). Since state court plaintiffs have no removal rights, the stay in Bur-
rows deprived the plaintiff of his only chance at a federal forum. See Evans Transp.
Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1982).
192. Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1982).
193. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450 (1976) (especially § 1441(a)- (b) (subject matter,
filing time, and bond)).
194. The state court defendant who is free to file a second action has little incen-
tive to remove because filing as plaintiff assures the plaintiffs choice of forum. See
note 190 supra. Although true only for state court defendants who are able to bring
independent federal actions, this would seem to include many of them, given the
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976). See'Note, Stays of Fed-
eral Proceedings in Deference to Concurrenty Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLuM. L. REV.
684, 704 (1960); Note, Federal Stays and Dismisals in Deference to Parallel State Court
Proceedings; The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 620, 627 (1977); Note,
Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation 59
YALE LJ. 978, 988-89 n.43 (1950). In Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut.
Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978), the court justified a stay based par-
tially on the federal plaintiff's failure to remove the state action. The court held
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plaintiff's federal action prevents this circumvention and avoids piecemeal
litigation.' 95
Either theory supports the stay in Microsoflware. There is no justifica-
tion, however, for the court's procedural holding. Allowing appeal from an
order denying a stay cannot be reconciled with prior law. Were the situa-
tion reversed, and the lower court had stayed the federal action, the need to
vindicate MCS's right to a federal forum could have outweighed the policy
against piecemeal appellate review. The district court, however, denied the
stay and acted according to the general rule by exercising jurisdiction.
Thus the issue entails weighing the convenience of the parties and courts
against the finality rule. By allowing appeal from the district court's order,
the Seventh Circuit simply traded duplication between the state and fed-
eral forums for waste between the federal district and appellate courts. 196
C. Colorado River Revived
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Microsofiware, the Supreme
Court dispelled the doubts following Will in Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercuy Construction Co. 197 The Court rejected the argument that Will
that the plaintiff should not have been permitted to "circumvent the statutory re-
moval procedures so as to entitle it to two forums in which to secure an adjudica-
tion of its identical claims." Id at 864. End runs around the removal statute are
disfavored. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169,
1173-74 (11th Cir. 1982) (dismissal justified in part because federal plaintiff had
allowed deadline for removal of prior state court action to pass); Southern Cal.
Petroleum Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 1960) (declaratory judg-
ment action dismissed even though federal plaintiff never had a right to remove);
Kaufman & Ruderman, Inc. v. Cohn & Rosenberger, 177 F.2d 849, 850 (2d Cir.
1949) (declaratory judgment statute may not be used to circumvent removal
provisions).
195. The Colorado River Court did not indicate whether the list of exceptional
circumstances factors is exhaustive. Prior decisions suggest an open ended test:
"some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the juris-
diction conferred." Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). See also
PPG Indus. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1973) (Meredith
list not exhaustive). Protection of the removal restrictions would fit either class. If
the Colorado River list is exhaustive, a stay to prevent circumvention of the removal
provisions could fall under "the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation." 424
U.S. at 818. In either case, the stay would be justified by something more than
mere administrative convenience.
Courts interpreting Microsofiware have declined to extend it beyond situations
where a federal plaintiff has waived an opportunity to remove a concurrent state
court action. See Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1982); Green v. Indal, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Ill. 1983); Architectural Floor
Prods. Co. v. Don Brann & Assocs., 551 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
196. 686 F.2d at 541 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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undermined Colorado River, because only four justices had joined the plural-
ity opinion in Will the four dissenting justices, plus Justice Blackmun, con-
curring only in the judgment, produced a majority in favor of applying
Colorado River." 8 Moreover, the Mercur Construction Court distinguished
Will as applying only to review by mandamus, and not to ordinary
appeal. '99
Perhaps more importantly, the Court held that the exceptional circum-
stances test applies to stays as well as dismissals:
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether a dismis-
sal or a stay should ordinarily be the preferred course of action
when a district court properly finds that Colorado River counsels in
favor of deferring to a parallel state court suit. We can say, how-
ever, that a stay is as much a refusal to exercise jurisdiction as a
dismissal.20  '
Applying the Colorado River test, the Court concluded that there were
no exceptional circumstances justifying the stay: (1) jurisdiction over prop-
erty and inconvenience of the federal forum were not at issue;2 0' (2) there
was no danger of piecemeal litigation resulting from deciding the arbitra-
tion issue in federal, rather than state court;20 2 and (3) although the state
court action was filed first, this priority did not justify the stay.20 ' The
Court rejected the "mechanical" concept of staying the federal action
merely because the state court suit was filed first, for "priority should not be
measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but . . . in terms
of how much progress had been made in the two actions.' 20 4 Because at
the time the stay was granted, the federal proceedings were running well
ahead of the state court action, the Court concluded the filing order
198. Id at 937. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
199. Id at 938.
200. Id at 943.
201. Id at 939.
202. Id Two different disputes were involved, Hospital against Mercury, and
Hospital against Architect, but only the first was covered by the arbitration agree-
ment. Under the Arbitration Act, agreements must be enforced even though they
do not reach all parties to the underlying dispute. Id at 939 nn.22-23. See 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976). Thus, piecemeal litigation was inevitable if arbitration proceeded, but
this result followed whether the arbitration question was decided in state or federal
court. 103 S. Ct. at 939.
203. 103 S. Ct. at 939.
204. Id Two factors made it unreasonable for Mercury to have filed first. The
state court had granted an exparte injunction forbidding Mercury from taking any
steps toward arbitration. Mercury did not file the federal action until the injunc-
tion was dissolved. Id at 940. See also id at n.34 (questioning but not deciding
whether the injunction could prevent Mercury from filing the federal suit). Not
only did Mercury feel restrained by the injunction, but it had to await Hospital's
refusal to arbitrate before commencing a suit to compel arbitration. Id & n.27. See
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
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weighed against issuing the stay.2"'
The Court also analyzed factors not expressly discussed in Colorado
River. Since the case arose under the Federal Arbitration Act,20 6 federal
law provided the rule of decision on the merits.2 0 7 Moreover, the state pro-
ceedings were unlikely to adequately protect Mercury's rights.20 8 Finally,
the Court observed:
[O]ur task in cases such as this is not to find some substantial rea-
son for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court;
rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist "exceptional"
circumstances, the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice
under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.2 0 9
Mercug Construction is important because it settles the confusion engen-
dered by Will and provides clearer guidance for lower courts. The decision
leaves open however, the propriety of stays in cases like Mirosoftware, which
involve only diversity jurisdiction. A number of factors distinguish
Microsoftware from Mercury Construction: (1) inconvenience of the federal fo-
rum, (2) the possibility that identical actions would proceed side-by-side, (3)
the inadequacy of relief in state court, (4) federal law controlling the merits,
and (5) the state court defendant's failure to remove. The last factor is
perhaps the best reason for distinguishing the cases, but the Court did not
address it in Mercur Construction .210 Aside from this distinction, however, it
seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would countenance the stay in
Microsoflware. It is fair to say that following Mercury Construction, district
courts enjoy virtually unlimited discretion to deny stays in concurrent pro-
ceedings, while orders granting stays will have to overcome the rigorous
presumption against the surrender of federal jurisdiction.
JOHN SULLIVAN
205. 103 S. Ct. at 940.
206. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
207. 103 S. Ct. at 941. The Court noted that federal law issues must "always be
a major consideration weighing against surrender." This conclusion was implicit in
Colorado River and Will See notes 143 & 163 supra.
208. 103 S. Ct. at 942-43.
209. Id at 942.
210. Mercury filed a petition to remove the Hospital's state court action, but the
district court remanded the case for lack of complete diversity. The state court suit
Was commenced by Hospital (a North Carolina corporation) against Architect (a
North Carolina corporation) and Mercury (an Alabama corporation). The
Supreme Court did not review the propriety of the removal or the remand. 103 S.
Ct. at 932-33 n.4.
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